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1.1 Topic of the Thesis: Unilateral Modification of Commitments 
International trade presupposes access to the domestic markets of other 
countries. In order to ensure secure, predictable and growing access to 
foreign markets, WTO members negotiate and bind tariff concessions for 
goods and commitments for services.1 These are annexed in schedules to the 
GATT and the GATS, and form an integral part thereof.2 The legal 
consequence of binding commitments is that WTO members may not raise 
market access barriers beyond the bound level.3 Yet, the consolidating of 
commitments does not tie the hands of members, as one might expect: 
Several WTO provisions permit members to modify or withdraw their 
commitments without violating their WTO obligations. While modification is 
primarily based on renegotiation, the prominent aspect of these provisions is 
that the member wishing to deviate from its commitments may do so, even if 
it is unable to secure permission from affected members. This aspect, which 
will be referred to as „unilateral modification‟, is the topic of the thesis. 
1.2 The Provisions Permitting Unilateral Modification of Commitments 
The GATT and GATS provide for a series of procedures to modify market 
access commitments, differing in scope and nature:4 Some allow temporary, 
others permanent modifications. Some may only be invoked if substantive 
conditions are met; others may be invoked independent of preconditions.5 
The most central and far-reaching provisions permitting unilateral 
modification of commitments are Art. XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS. Modification 
pursuant to these provisions does not presuppose that material conditions are 
                                           
1 Hereinafter, GATT tariff concessions for goods and GATS market access commitments for services will be referred to 
with the common terms „market access commitments‟ or simply „commitments‟. The term „modification‟ will 
hereinafter encompass both modification and complete withdrawal of a commitment. The WTO member wishing to 
modify or withdraw its bound commitment will be referred to as „the modifying member‟. 
2 Art. II:7 GATT, XX:3 GATS. Schedules of concessions and commitments are therefore also part of the WTO “covered 
Agreements”. 
3 Art. II:1 (a) and (b) GATT, XVI GATS; Argentina – Textiles and Apparel (AB), para. 46. 
4 These procedures are only provided for in the GATT and GATS, due to the fact that other WTO agreements are 
unrelated to the idea of exchanging market access commitments, cf. section 5 below. 
5 John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT (1969), p. 229; Bernard M. Hoekman & Michel M. Kostecki, 




met: Any commitment may be modified for any reason for an indefinite 
period of time.6 
Art. XXIV:6 GATT and V:5 GATS also permit unilateral modification, and are of 
significant practical importance. They provide that the procedures of Art. 
XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS are to be followed if, in the formation or alteration 
of a regional economic integration area, market access barriers have to be 
raised beyond the bound level in one or more of the constituent territories.7 
Another provision for unilateral modification of commitments is Art. XVIII:7 
GATT. This is available for developing countries and may only be used for the 
purpose of promoting the establishment of a particular industry. Implicitly, the 
provision permits developing countries to proceed unilaterally: The 
developing country must make a reasonable effort to come to a negotiated 
solution, but ultimately no authorization from affected members is required.8 
Furthermore, Art. XXVII GATT allows a member to unilaterally withhold or 
withdraw a commitment if the state with which the commitment was 
negotiated did not eventually become a member, or if it ceases to be one.  
Finally, there is the general implied authority to correct errors through a 
process normally termed „rectification‟.9 
The safeguards clause, Art. XIX GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards, also 
provides for unilateral modification of commitments.10 In principle, measures 
under the general exceptions (Art. XX GATT and XIV GATS), the security 
                                           
6 Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World 
Trade Organization, 31 J. Legal Stud. 179 (2002), p. 186. 
7 Anwarul Hoda, Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO: Procedure and Practices 
(2001), p. 17. Modification is not done unilaterally by one member in this scenario, but one may still speak of unilateral 
modification because the regional economic integration area may modify its common commitments without the 
permission of affected members. 
8 Hoda, ibid. 
9 Jackson, supra note 5, at 230. There is no explicit authority in the GATT for rectification, while Art. XXI:5 GATS gives 
the Council for Trade in Services the competence to establish procedures for rectification. Correction of errors is, 
however, a process concomitant to any treaty and concerning which some customary international law exists. The 
practice is generally that the modifying member unilaterally rectifies the commitment, notifies all parties to this effect, 
and if no objections are received, the rectified commitment is effective. 
10 Indeed, the language of Art. XIX GATT is very similar to that of Art. XXVIII GATT: “If agreement (…) is not reached, 





exceptions (Art. XXI GATT and XIV bis GATS), as well as anti-dumping 
measures, are taken unilaterally. An agreement with affected members is not 
necessary for invoking the measures. Nevertheless, these measures are 
conditional upon the existence of relatively strict substantive preconditions. 
Most are also inherently temporary. The thesis will be delimited to the 
provisions permitting unilateral modification for an indefinite period of time 
and independent of the existence of substantive preconditions. The unilateral 
aspect of temporary suspensions will therefore not be examined further. 
1.3 Outline and Method of the Thesis 
The objective of the thesis is to examine unilateral modification of WTO 
commitments from different perspectives and using different methods: 
Normative law, dogmatic legal interpretation, comparative methods and the 
political economy of law.  
The thesis proceeds as follows: Section 2 examines, from a de lege ferenda 
perspective, if and to what degree WTO members should be allowed to 
unilaterally modify their commitments. In particular, the section will highlight 
the objective and purpose of including unilateral modification provisions in 
the GATT and the GATS. Having established to what degree unilateral 
modifications should be permitted; the unilateral aspect of the principal 
modification provisions will be interpreted in section 3, thus illustrating how the 
contractual objects and purposes resonate in the text of the agreements. 
Section 3 aims at interpreting the principal provisions according to the rules of 
interpretation prescribed by Article 3.2 DSU. In section 4, issues concerning the 
relationship between unilateral modification and dispute settlement will be 
examined. The method will be contextual and comparative interpretation. 
Given that a WTO member may unilaterally modify its commitments, the 
legally binding nature of WTO obligations, in general, and market access 
commitments, in particular, has been questioned. This will be examined in 




Throughout the thesis, contract theory and concepts of political economics of 
law will be referred to. International political economy refers to inter-
disciplinary methods drawing upon law, economics and political science in 
explaining how international trade and state policies affecting international 
trade influence each other. A main theorem of the science is that 
governments are not necessarily the welfare-maximising entities found in 
economic theory, but develop policy subject to the pressure of a variety of 
interest groups.11 Political economy therefore explains phenomena by using 
approaches beyond law and economics‟ standard methods. 
2. TO WHAT DEGREE SHOULD WTO MEMBERS BE ALLOWED TO UNILATERALLY 
MODIFY THEIR COMMITMENTS? 
2.1 Introduction 
Principles, such as security and predictability, flexibility and reciprocity, may 
explain why and to what extent WTO members have agreed to permit 
unilateral modification of commitments. 
The objectives and purposes of permitting unilateral modifications are 
manifold, and build partly on principles explicitly recognized in the WTO 
Agreements, partly on AB jurisprudence, and partly on considerations of 
economy and political economy. 
A norm may arise from weighing different considerations and interests: Several 
principles do not support unilateral modifications, while others do. Some 
principles do not per se determine whether unilateral modifications should be 
permitted, but govern how unilateral modifications should be done and at 
what price such modification should come.  
2.2 Principles Which Do Not Support Unilateral Modifications  
2.2.1 The Security and Predictability of Market Access Commitments Does 
Not Support Unconditional Access to Unilateral Modification 
The AB and panels often refer to the security and predictability of market 
access commitments. For instance, the AB agreed with the panel that: 
                                           




[T]he security and predictability of “the reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade” 
is an object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, generally, as well as of the GATT 
1994.12  
The AB in US – Sunset Review added that:  
The GATT and the WTO, as well as the dispute settlement system, are intended to 
protect not only existing trade but also the security and predictability needed to 
conduct future trade.13 
Considering the importance of security and predictability, unilateral modifi-
cation of commitments should not be permitted, at least not unconditionally. 
If a member were free to unilaterally modify its commitments at any given 
time, the predictability for its trading partners and their economic operators 
would be significantly reduced.  
On the other hand, even though a principle aim of the WTO is the protection 
of expectations, the WTO system does not concern itself with protecting 
expectations of a specific trade volume for a specific product or service.14 
The AB has, concerning Art. III GATT, stressed that “[it] protects expectations 
not of any particular trade volume but rather of the equal competitive 
relationship between imported and domestic products”.15 Hence, as long as 
mechanisms exist to ensure that the competitive relationship is not altered, 
unilateral modification of commitments may be permitted. This is precisely the 
way the provisions providing for unilateral modifications are structured.  
The security and predictability of commitments may also be protected by 
other means than by prohibiting unilateral modifications. For instance, 
unilateral modification may be subjected to disciplining requirements like 
                                           
12 EC – Computer Equipment (AB), para. 82. In EEC – Panel on Newsprint, the GATT panel “shared the view expressed 
before it relating to the fundamental importance of the security and predictability of GATT tariff bindings, a principle 
which constitutes a central obligation in the system of the General Agreement”, cf. paras. 52-53. 
13 US – Sunset Review (AB),  para. 82.  
14 Chi Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper 05/06, p. 12. The working paper is recently 
published in an edited version as an article, see Chios Carmody, A Theory of WTO Law, 11 Journal of International 
Economic Law 527 (2008). One may detect a change of orientation in panel jurisprudence towards the greater 
protection of economic operators, although this is still controversial, see US – Section 301 Trade Act.  
15 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB), p. 16; Korea – Alcoholic Beverages (AB), para. 119; Japan – Alcoholic 




time-intervals of firm validity of commitments, notification requirements, duties 
of consultation and negotiation with affected parties.16 
2.2.2 The Principles of Negotiation and Multilateralism Do Not Support 
Unsanctioned Unilateral Modification 
It is commonly argued that the very essence of the world trading system 
consists of overcoming unilateral conduct in international trade relations.17 The 
principles of negotiation and multilateralism are inherent in the WTO and 
weaves through its agreements like a red thread. With regard to the 
settlement of disputes, the DSU explicitly precludes members from taking 
unilateral action.18 In this light, unilateral modification seems counterintuitive. 
However, a distinction must be drawn between unsanctioned unilateral 
behaviour and sanctioned unilateral behaviour which the members have 
agreed upon and incorporated in the WTO agreements: Although the 
measure itself is unilateral, the legal basis for it is multilaterally agreed. Even 
still, the modifying member should, according to the principles of 
multilateralism and negotiation, first enter into negotiation with a view to 
achieve a mutually agreed solution before resorting to unilateral 
modification. 
2.2.3 Raising Market Access Barriers is Not Economically Sound 
In economics, market access liberalization is a gain, even if done unilaterally. 
The world trade order is based on the economic theory of free trade, which 
teaches that all participating states profit from open trade, even if states 
unilaterally open their markets. From this theoretical viewpoint, it would be in 
the interest of states to abandon or lower trade barriers unilaterally, rather 
                                           
16 However, one may consider these disciplining requirements as means to ease a transition to the changed 
commitments, rather than actually ensuring security and stability of said commitments. 
17 Meinhard Hilf, Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation for WTO/GATT-Law?, 4 Journal of International 
Economic Law 111 (2001), p. 119, arguing that, “in general, unilateral measures need a specific justification under 
WTO law”. 
18Article 23 DSU; US – Certain EC Products (AB), para. 111; US – Section 301 Trade Act (panel), para. 7.45; EC – 
Commercial Vessels (panel), para. 7.207; Antonis Antoniadis, Unilateral Measures and WTO Dispute Settlement: An EC 




than unilaterally raising them.19 Another rationale, beyond standard 
economics, must therefore underlie the unilateral modification provisions.  
2.3 Principles Supporting Unilateral Modification 
2.3.1 Unilateral Modification May Be Necessary for Reasons of Political 
Economy 
Political economy maintains that governments do not strictly follow the 
rational recommendations following from free trade theory and do not 
necessarily aim at maximising overall national welfare. While liberalization of 
trade is beneficial for a national economy in its entirety, there are clear 
winners and losers among individual economic subjects.20 Governments are 
not independent entities that can comply freely with economic insights. The 
decision-making process is influenced by respective interests of individuals, 
economic sectors and institutional and social groups.21 
For reasons of political economy, therefore, a member might need to or be 
willing to redistribute wealth among its economic operators by sheltering 
some from international competition (this is the domestic result of a 
modification), while overexposing others to it (this is what compensatory 
commitments or retaliatory modification by affected members essentially 
amounts to).22 
2.3.2 Flexibility Encourages Governments to Make Commitments 
A leading purpose for permitting unilateral modification of commitments is 
flexibility.23 Although the WTO may be understood primarily as protecting 
                                           
19 Peter-Tobias Stoll & Frank Schorkopf, WTO – World Economic Order, World Trade Law (2006), paras. 62 and 104. J. 
Michael Finger, A Diplomat‟s Economics: Reciprocity in the Uruguay Negotiations, 4 World Trade Review 27 (2005), p. 
36. This is true when considering the economy of a state as a whole; economic theory of free trade does not address 
questions about the distribution of this prosperity or priorities of economic development. 
20 Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at para. 106. 
21 Costs of liberalization are generally concentrated in specific industries, which are often well organized and oppose 
liberalization, whereas the benefits of liberalization usually accrue to a larger set of individuals who have no individual 
incentive to organize themselves politically. This is usually referred to as the theory of collective action, see Mancur 
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1977), cited by Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at para. 107. 
22 Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods: The GATT and the Other Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods (2007) 
(hereinafter Mavroidis 2007), p. 98; Petros C. Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Commentary 
(2005) (hereinafter Mavroidis: 2005), p. 88. 




expectations concerning trade, it may also be conceived as aiming at 
facilitating adjustment to realities encountered in trade.24 
The WTO agreements are incomplete contracts between states. They cannot 
foresee or formulate conditional responses for all future contingencies. 
Changed circumstances and political reality will require adjustments to be 
made from time to time: Domestic policy may, for a variety of reasons, 
demand that some commitments be modified.25  
Flexibility serves the process of progressive liberalization.26 Introducing flexibility 
by permitting unilateral modification of market access commitments will 
induce governments to make more meaningful commitments in the first 
place.27 Kenneth W. Dam explains the rationale for including unilateral 
modification provisions in the GATT: 
The GATT has a special interest in seeing that as many agreements for the reduction of 
tariffs as possible are made. Enforcement of bindings is important in the GATT insofar 
as such enforcement gives contracting parties the confidence necessary to rely upon 
tariff concessions offered by other contracting parties. But because of the economic 
nature of tariff concessions and the domestic political sensitivity inherently involved in 
trade issues, a system that made withdrawals of concessions impossible would tend to 
discourage the making of concessions in the first place. It is better, for example, that 
100 commitments should be made and that that 10 should be withdrawn than that 
only 50 commitments should be made and that all of them should be kept.28 
Unilateral modification provisions therefore act as „safety valves‟ encouraging 
significant reductions of trade barriers. Indeed, the provisions were considered 
essential as means of promoting liberalization.29 
                                           
24 Carmody, supra note 14 at 3, 14. This was recognized by the panel in Turkey – Textiles when it pointed out that 
“[t]he WTO system of rights and obligations provides, in certain instances, flexibility to meet the specific 
circumstances of Members”, cf. Turkey – Textiles (panel), para. 9.184. 
25 Finger, supra note 19 at 31.  
26 Mavroidis (2007), supra note 22 at 98; Wolfrum et al., supra note 23 at 468. 
27 Raj Bhala, Modern GATT Law: A Treatise on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (2005), p. 318. 
28 Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization (1970), p. 80; Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. 
Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (2002), p. 49. Dam‟s observation concerning the GATT remains 
even truer for market access commitments in services.  
29 Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 28 at 50. The Preparatory Committee noted that Article XXVIII:2 was included in order 




However, given the principles of security and predictability of commitments, 
flexibility should not necessarily entail permitting unilateral reduction of the 
general level of mutually advantageous commitments. Rather, flexibility 
should entail permitting members to liberalize trade according to their current 
and individual policy objectives and constraints as demanded by the present 
political economy.30 
2.3.3 Unilateral Modification Provisions Allow Members to Avoid the 
Amendment Procedure 
A core advantage of the provisions permitting unilateral modification is that 
members do not have to invoke the somewhat cumbersome amendment 
procedure.31 Schedules of commitments are integral parts of the GATT and 
GATS. As such, without the modification provisions, they would have to be 
amended in accordance with Article X WTOA. Without the required 
consensus, members wishing to modify would have to resort to trade 
remedies, which are conditional and temporary. Worse yet, members would 
be reluctant to bind commitments in the first place.32 
2.3.4 Development as a WTO Objective Influences the Access to Unilateral 
Modification 
Development, a fundamental objective of the WTO,33 also influences 
members‟ access to unilateral modification. Although unilateral liberalization 
of market access commitments is generally considered to be beneficial to the 
members‟ economy, developing members are often reliant on trade barriers 
to generate state revenue. Thus, in order to secure the economic 
development in developing countries, access to unilateral modification of 
market access commitments should be greater for these members. In 
addition, similar to market access negotiations, developed members should 
                                                                                                                                   
permit the necessary flexibility for withdrawing individual items as an alternative to complete withdrawal from the 
Agreement”, see EPCT/TAC/PV/14, p. 32. 
30 Wolfrum et al., supra note 23 at 468. 
31 Ibid; Hunter Nottage & Thomas Sebastian, Giving Legal Effect to the Results of WTO Trade Negotiations: An Analysis 
of the Methods of Changing WTO Law, 9 Journal of International Economic Law 989 (2006),  p. 996. 
32 Bhala, supra note 27 at 318. See section 2.3.2 about the advantages of flexibility. 




not expect reciprocity in renegotiation or retaliatory modification. These two 
considerations are reflected in Art. XVIII:7 GATT. 
2.4 Principles Governing How Unilateral Modification Should Be Done and 
at What Price Modification Should Come 
2.4.1 Reciprocity and Balance – More Political Economy 
Even though unilateral market access liberalization in economic terms is a 
gain, WTO members view their market access commitments as costs which 
are warranted only when an offsetting benefit is obtained from reciprocal 
market access commitments by their trading partners. The WTO facilitates 
such mutually advantageous increases in market access on reciprocal basis 
and provides rules to secure them. At the same time, members are not held 
rigidly to their commitments, or the level of commitments implied by their 
negotiations. But they are held to the balance of commitments as a whole, to 
the equilibrium of benefits and concessions.34 
The principle of reciprocity, widely recognized as a pillar of the GATT,35 is 
central to achieve and maintain the overall balance of commitments. The 
liberalization of world trade is pursued on the basis of reciprocity.36 In principle, 
members incur no obligation to open up their markets unilaterally. Instead, 
the WTO counts on the mutual interest of the members in access to foreign 
markets.37 Like the AB emphasized concerning negotiations: “[They] are a 
process of reciprocal demands and concessions, of „give and take‟”.38 
Broadly construed, reciprocity refers to the idea of mutual changes in trade 
policy that bring about changes in the volume of each member‟s import that 
are equal to the changes in the volume of its exports.39  
                                           
34 The AB has condemned measures that “would fundamentally alter the overall balance of concessions Article 
XXVIII [GATT] is meant to achieve”, cf. EC – Poultry (AB), para. 101; EC – Poultry (panel), para. 215. The balance is not 
singular and static, but rather something that is in constant flux, see in an unrelated context US – Shrimp, para. 159. 
See also Kyle Bagwell & Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, It‟s a Question of Market Access, 96 American 
Journal of International Law 56 (2002), p. 59.  
35 Perhaps, at this stage, less so with regard to the GATS. 
36 Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at 38. Reciprocity is basic to any negotiation; the potential gain is what brings 
parties to the table, see Finger, supra note 19 at 29. 
37 Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at 38. 
38 EC – Computer Equipment (AB), para. 109. 




The concept of reciprocity does not, as such, give guidance as to whether 
unilateral modification of commitments should be permitted. Reciprocity is, 
however, a guiding principle in how unilateral modification should proceed 
and at what price it shall come. When market access barriers are being 
raised unilaterally or as part of renegotiation, reciprocity entails that the 
members involved should be permitted to reinstate the balance of 
commitments.40 Without reciprocity, it is unlikely that unilateral modification 
would be condoned. It will be shown in section 3.4 that the provisions 
permitting unilateral modifications of commitments are some of the clearest 
expressions of reciprocity in the WTO. The provisions illustrate the idea that 
GATT and GATS to a large degree concern maintaining a level of reciprocally 
negotiated market access commitments; as long as members stay within a 
cooperative equilibrium, it is less material what the actual level of market 
access is for the specific product or service.41 
From an economic point of view, the notions of reciprocity or balance, and 
thus unilateral modification and “retaliatory” modification, are paradoxical: 
The arbitrators in EC – Bananas recognized that “the suspension of 
concessions is not in the interest of either [party]”.42 It would be members‟ best 
interest to abandon trade barriers unilaterally instead of unilaterally raising 
them. It is therefore also a paradox that a member affected by another 
member‟s unilateral modification, will wish to reinstate the balance by raising 
its own market access barriers.43 Like one commentator put it, “[i]f another 
country refuses to build more roads, the WTO allows you to tear up your 
own”.44 
Apparently, then, the rationale of reciprocity and unilateral modification must 
be found in political economy, and gain must be measured in political 
                                           
40 Ibid. 
41 Mavroidis (2007) supra note 22 at 98. 
42 EC – Bananas (Award of the Arbitrators), para. 2.13.  
43 Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at para. 104. 
44 David Yocis, Hardened Positions: Guatemala Cement and WTO Review of Antidumping Determinations, 76 New 




welfare.45 Interestingly, reciprocity has a dual function in this regard: (i) Vis-à-
vis the other members, reciprocity is a central element in the negotiation, 
operation and modification of commitments; but (ii) vis-à-vis the member‟s 
own domestic constituencies, reciprocity makes it easier to resist the exertion 
of the influence of interest groups that favour continued trade protection.46 
2.4.2 The Principle of Proportionality Should Govern the Extent of Reaction to 
Unilateral Modification 
The principle of proportionality is closely connected to the principle of 
reciprocity. At its most abstract, proportionality entails that action undertaken 
must be proportionate to its objective. In case of unilateral modification, 
proportionality guides the extent to which affected members are permitted 
to respond, i.e. the response should not go further than what is necessary to 
reinstate the balance of commitments. Punitive retaliation would be 
disproportionate. 
2.4.3 The Principle of Non-Discrimination Entails that Unilateral Modification 
Should Be Done on a MFN Basis 
The principle of non-discrimination does not, as such, give guidance on 
whether unilateral modification should be permitted and, if so, to what 
degree. It does, nonetheless, play a role in the implementation of the actual 
modification: According to the MFN-principle, the modification must be done 
vis-à-vis all members and not discriminate against one or more members. A 
controversial question is whether retaliatory reaction to unilateral modification 
may be done on a MFN basis or only vis-à-vis the modifying member.47  
                                           
45 Cf. section 2.3.1. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Economics and 
Politics (2007), p. 18; Wolfgang Benedek, Die Rechtsordnung des GATT aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht, Beiträge zum 
ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht (1990), p.54. 
46 Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at para. 108. Reciprocity will lead members affected by unilateral modification to 
retaliate, thus targeting another specific export-oriented domestic interest in the modifying member state. One could 
say that by giving reciprocal concessions, policymakers „tie their hands to the mast of free(er) trade‟. 




3. INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS PERMITTING UNILATERAL MODIFI-
CATION OF COMMITMENTS 
3.1 Introduction and Overview 
Now that the contractual reasons behind unilateral modification have been 
examined, this section interprets provisions condoning unilateral modification 
of market access commitments. The interpretation is delimited to the two 
main provisions, Art. XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS. These provisions also apply to 
the formation or modification of regional economic integration areas by 
virtue of Art. XXIV:6 GATT and XXI GATS. Further, the interpretation is restricted 
to the unilateral aspects of these provisions; the multilateral routes have 
already been thoroughly examined by scholars.48 The method utilized in this 
section is that prescribed by Article 3.2 DSU.49 
Art. XXVIII GATT provides for the possibility of unilateral modification of tariff 
concessions after negotiation and consultation with certain affected 
members, which are given a right to respond. There are three different routes 
of renegotiation, which all may lead to unilateral modification: (i) „Three year‟ 
or „open season‟ renegotiations under paragraph 1 and 2; (ii) „reserved‟ 
renegotiations under paragraph 5; and (iii) „special circumstances‟ 
renegotiation upon authorization under paragraph 4.50 
In the negotiations, the modifying member is expected to give compensatory 
commitments on other products. If agreement is not reached, the modifying 
member may proceed unilaterally and certain affected members may 
withdraw substantially equivalent commitments. 
Art. XXI GATS provides for a similar procedure, but with two main differences: 
Firstly, GATS does not distinguish between different routes of renegotiation. 
                                           
48 See, inter alia, Bhala, supra note 27; Dam, supra note 28; Hoda, supra note 7; Jackson, supra note 5; Mavroidis 
(2007) supra note 22; GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice (6th ed 1994), pp. 863-910.  
49 ”[C]ustomary rules of interpretation of public international law”, i.e. “the general rule of interpretation” set out in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32, see US – Gasoline (AB), p. 16 and Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II (AB), para. 104. The ordinary meaning of the terms in their context and in light of object and purpose are 
the main parameters for the interpretation. If necessary, recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, i.e. the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. 




Secondly, arbitration may be requested by affected members if no 
agreement is reached. The differences will be dealt with consecutively.51  
3.2 Unilateral Modification of Commitments is an Absolute Right 
Scholars have described the right to unilaterally modify commitments 
pursuant to Art. XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS as an “absolute right” provided that 
the prescribed procedure is followed.52 An absolute right is a right which is 
unqualified, and which cannot be denied or curtailed.53 
The exercise of the right does not depend on an agreement being reached 
with members which will be affected by the modification: It is expressly 
recognized in Art. XXVIII GATT that even if an agreement cannot be reached, 
the modifying member “shall, nevertheless, be free [to modify or withdraw the 
concession]”.54 A member may or may not choose to exercise the right; it is 
not a benefit which the rest of the WTO members hold and allot to „lucky‟ 
members as they see fit. Rather, it is a legal right of any individual member.55 
Moreover, the terms of the provisions do not qualify the right to unilaterally 
modify a commitment by any substantial prerequisites or requirements.56 Art. 
XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS may be invoked independent of the occurrence of 
an agreed contingency (as opposed to the safeguards clause). The initiative 
to launch the process rests solely with the modifying member and perceived 
political expediency suffices (but is not required).57 
The words “shall, nevertheless, be free to do so” are found only in relation to 
renegotiation according to Art. XXVIII:3 and 5 GATT. Some scholars have 
therefore questioned whether there is a right to unilaterally modify 
                                           
51 In general, the differences between the GATT and GATS may be explained by the different objects of regulation 
and, thus, the different regulatory aims and structures, in addition to practical experience. For instance, trade barriers 
for services are mostly of a regulatory nature. Service liberalization is, moreover, a socially sensitive issue and the level 
of liberalization is low. Political economy will therefore require more flexibility to encourage liberalization. Finally, the 
historical alignment with the negotiation of the DSU may have had an impact on Art. XXI GATS. 
52 Jackson, supra note 5 at 231; Hoda, supra note 7 at 16. 
53 Black‟s Law Dictionary (8th edition), p. 1347. A relative right, on the other hand, is a right that arises from and 
depends on someone else‟s right. 
54 Art. XXVIII:3(a) GATT. 
55 Bhala, supra note 27 at 320. 
56 Jackson, supra note 5 at 231. 




commitments following the special circumstances renegotiation pursuant to 
Art. XXVIII:4(d) GATT. This paragraph dictates in its third sentence that the 
modifying member shall be free to unilaterally modify its commitment “unless 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES determine that [the modifying member] has 
unreasonably failed to offer adequate compensation”. The ordinary meaning 
of the terms suggests that the WTO members may veto or block a unilateral 
modification under the special circumstances renegotiation. Indeed, this has 
lead scholars to conclude that unilateral modification is not an option under 
Art. XXVIII:4 GATT.58 
That view is not sustainable. It fails to take the immediate context into 
account. The next sentence reads “[i]f such action is taken”, i.e. if the 
modifying member proceeds despite the CONTRACTING PARTIES judging that 
it had unreasonably failed to offer adequate compensation, affected 
members “shall be free (...) to modify (...) substantially equivalent 
concessions”. When read in its entirety, Art. XXVIII:4 GATT does not prohibit 
unilateral action; rather, it qualifies when affected members may retaliate: 
Unreasonable failure by the modifying member to offer adequate 
compensation is the standard or determining when affected member have 
the right to retaliate, and not whether the modifying member may proceed 
unilaterally. The WTO members cannot block such behaviour.59 
Art. XXVIII:4 GATT may nevertheless still be viewed as a multilateral option: 
Given that authorization is required before the modifying member can enter 
into negotiation, the authorization must be granted by a consensus decision, 
                                           
58 Jackson, supra note 5 at 235. The original GATT-47 contained no provision allowing for the special circumstances 
renegotiation. Various GATT parties appealed to the CONTRACTING PARTIES for special dispensation to renegotiate 
and were generally granted the right to do so. The procedures were termed analogous to Art. XXVIII, except that, 
due to the unanimity requirement, all members had a chance to participate. The so-called „sympathetic 
consideration‟ for renegotiation in „special circumstances‟ was always granted at that time, reflecting the fact that 
the GATT was (and still is) an unfinished agreement, and that the CONTRACTING PARTIES generally recognized the 
need for greater flexibility. Art. XXVIII was ultimately renegotiated in 1954 to include the special circumstances 
renegotiation. Unilateral withdrawal was not permitted if renegotiations were unsuccessful under the „sympathetic 
considerations‟ regime that Article XXVIII:4 replaced. 
59 Bhala, supra note 27 at 336-337; Mavroidis (2007), supra note 22 at 111. According to Bhala, “what the last clause 
(...) does is eliminate the freedom of the applicant to act with impunity”. The term impunity gives association to 
criminal law, and is, perhaps, not entirely fitting. Bhala reads the clause from the modifying member‟s side, whereas I 





and the agreement of potentially negatively affected members is necessary 
to reach consensus, it is likely that negotiations on compensation effectively 
take place before authorization is granted.60 
It has also been questioned whether modifying members are barred from 
acting unilaterally after arbitration pursuant to Article XXI:4 GATS. 
Subparagraph (a) provides that “[t]he modifying Member may not modify or 
withdraw its commitment until it has made compensatory adjustment in 
conformity with the findings of the arbitration”. The ordinary meaning of the 
terms suggests that they limit the freedom to unilaterally modify commitments, 
in the sense of eliminating it entirely, unless the modifying member abides by 
the arbitration award regarding compensation. 
Again, the immediate context suggests another understanding of the 
provision: According to subparagraph (b), “[i]f the modifying Member 
implements its proposed modification or withdrawal and does not comply 
with the findings of the arbitration, any affected Member that participated in 
the arbitration may modify or withdraw substantially equivalent benefits”. 
When both subparagraphs are read together, they determine when affected 
members may retaliate; they do not block the modifying member from acting 
unilaterally.61 
Accordingly, in all routes of renegotiation provided by Art. XXVIII GATT and XXI 
GATS, save perhaps for the GATT special circumstances renegotiation, the 
modifying member has the unequivocal freedom to proceed unilaterally with 
its modification. 
3.3 Procedural Requirements Must Be Met before Unilaterally Modifying 
Commitments 
3.3.1 Overview of Procedural Requirements 
Like most rights, the right of a WTO member to unilaterally modify its 
commitments is not without its attendant responsibilities. Although the wish for 
                                           
60 Mavroidis (2007), supra note 19 at 111. 
61 The implementing procedures suggest the opposite, see S/L/80, Procedures for the Implementation of Article XXI of 




flexibility has led to WTO members condoning unilateral modification of 
commitments without having to fulfil substantive or material requirements, the 
wish for security and predictability of market access commitments, as well as 
the principles of multilateralism and negotiation, require that unilateral 
modification be subjected to structuring disciplines of procedural nature. 
To that effect, the provisions permitting unilateral modification set out the 
following procedural responsibilities: (i) Modification may only be done at 
given time intervals or upon authorization; (ii)modification must be preceded 
by notification; (iii) certain categories of WTO members must be consulted or 
negotiated with; and (iv) the modifying member may have to enter into 
arbitration with affected members. 
3.3.2 Modification May Only Be Done at Specific Time Intervals 
If members were free to modify their commitments at any given time, legal 
certainty and predictability would be compromised.62 The modification 
provisions therefore contain various time intervals and deadlines within which 
modifications must be done.  
With regard to service commitments, in order for modification to be 
commenced, at least “three years” must have elapsed from the date of the 
entry into force of the commitment.63 In other words, GATS commitments have 
a firm validity of three years. A shorter period would have a negative impact 
on the sustainability of trade in services and the liberalization thereof.64 
After three years have lapsed from the entry into force of a given 
commitment, however, a member shall be free to modify it “at any time”.65 
The firm validity of the commitment is therefore not automatically renewed. 
Thus, flexibility seems to be prioritized over security and predictability. As will 
be shown, the members have agreed on less flexibility for goods. The reason 
                                           
62 Bhala, supra note 27 at 332-333.  
63 Art. XXI:1(a).  
64 Wolfrum et al., supra note 23 at 468-469. Wolfrum et al. note that although the purpose of Art. XXI is to provide 
flexibility to react to economic/political changes, it is not meant to “give a power immediately to open the next 
round of negotiation starting from a new status quo”. 




for the difference may be that the level of liberalization of services is at a 
more rudimentary level than for goods. As argued above, flexibility is 
indispensable in securing further liberalization, cf. section 2.3.2. 
In Art. XXVIII GATT, the relevant language is more intricate. Essentially, the 
three different routes of renegotiation provide for different periods of time in 
which modifications are permitted: 
(i) For „three year‟ renegotiations, modifications may be done on “the 
first day of each three year period”, the first of which began 1 
January 1958, the last of which began 1 January 2009.66 
(ii) For „reserved‟ renegotiation, modifications may be done during the 
three year period referred to above if the modifying member has, 
before the beginning of the period, elected to reserve the right to 
renegotiate.67 
(iii) For „special circumstances‟ renegotiation, modifications may be 
done “at any time” in special circumstances upon the authorization 
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 68 
In principle, GATT commitments have three-year periods of firm validity that 
are automatically renewed, thus serving the security and predictability of 
market access commitments. The „special circumstances‟ and „reserved‟ 
renegotiations provide exceptions, resonating the importance of flexibility.69 
Predictability is still preserved, though: It is the WTO members which decide 
whether „special circumstances‟ renegotiations should be authorized70 and 
„reserved renegotiations‟ give potentially affected members timely warning 
that modification may occur during the next three year period. This option is, 
moreover, only a tool for far-sighted members, i.e. those members 
                                           
66
 Art. XXVIII:1 and 2 GATT. Records of renegotiations are so far not publicly available. 
67
 Art. XXVIII:5 GATT. 
68 Art. XXVIII: 4 GATT.  
69 The Review Session Working Party Report resulting in the present text of Art. XXVIII noted that “the Article should 
provide for the extension of the firm validity of the schedules by three-year periods, but with greater flexibility in the 
right to renegotiate and in the procedures for renegotiation (…) during the periods of firm validity”, see L/329, 
adopted 26 February 1955, 3s/205, 217, para. 27 (iii) (emphasis added). 
70
 Although, as argued above, once the authorization is given, the modifying member may proceed even without an 




anticipating the possible need to revisit a bound market access 
commitment.71 Members increasingly reserve the right to renegotiate, even 
though a need for renegotiations might not be in sight. Concern has justly 
been raised about the insecurity of tariff bindings that this may lead to.72 
3.3.3 Modification Must Be Preceded by Notification 
Members wishing to modify a commitment must notify the WTO. Art. XXI:1(b) 
GATS provides that “[a] modifying Member shall notify its intent to modify or 
withdraw a commitment (...) to the Council for Trade no later than three 
months before the intended date of implementation”. There is no similar 
wording in Article XXVIII GATT, but the Ad Article XXVIII paragraph 1 note 
requires that “no earlier than six months, nor later than three months, (...) a 
contracting party wishing to modify or withdraw any concession (...) should 
notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES to this effect”.73 A requirement of 
notification is also de facto implicit in the requirement to consult or negotiate 
with certain categories of WTO members. 
3.3.4 The Modifying Member Must Consult or Negotiate with Categories of 
WTO Members 
The procedural obligations owed to other members and the affected 
members‟ correlative right of response vary according to different categories 
of WTO members. In short, obligations are owed to the members which will 
suffer the most from the modification.74 
In the GATS, the procedural obligations are put in simple terms: The modifying 
member must “enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on 
any necessary compensatory adjustment” with any member which “may be 
affected”.75 This duty arises only “[a]t the request” of an affected member. 
The term “affected Member” is neither quantitatively nor qualitatively 
                                           
71 Bhala, supra note 27 at 335. 
72 GATT Analytical Index, supra note 48 at 883, citing a Secretariat Note for the Committee on Tariff Concessions. 
73 Annex I, Notes and Supplementary Provisions, Ad Article XXVIII paragraph 1, nr. 3. The ad notes contained in Annex 
I to the GATT are made an integral part of the GATT by virtue of Art. XXXIV GATT. 
74 Mavroidis (2007), supra note 22 at 102. 




qualified. WTO Members to which an obligation of negotiation is owed must 
not actually be affected. It suffices for the obligation of negotiation to arise 
that the requesting member “may”, i.e. potentially, be affected by the 
modification. In comparison with the GATT, where the modifying member will 
only have to negotiate with a select group of members, renegotiation in the 
GATS is „multilateralized‟.76 
The terms of the equivalent GATT provisions are yet again far more intricate. 
For the purpose of renegotiation and unilateral modification of GATT 
commitments, WTO members have been divided into the following 
categories: The modifying member; members having initial negotiating rights 
(“INR”); members having a principal supplying interest (“PSI”); and members 
having a substantial interest (“SI”) in the commitment.77 In addition to these 
categories, the following categories of members may be identified: Members 
which are affected but do not have an INR, PSI or a SI, and members which 
are not affected by the modification at all. The latter two categories are not 
given rights according to Art. XXVIII GATT. 
To WTO members with initial negotiating rights and principal supplying interest, 
the modifying member owes “negotiation”. To WTO members with substantial 
interest, it owes “consultation”.78 The precise difference between the terms is 
not clear. The ordinary meaning suggests, however, that consultation does 
                                           
76 Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organization, Law, Practice, and Policy (2nd edition), p. 674.  
Two reasons may explain this difference between the GATT and GATS: Firstly, the concept of negotiating rights could 
not be instituted in the GATS, at least in the beginning, because there was no reliable and comparable information 
on trade flows, which is the basis of negotiating rights in the GATT. In other words, there was no basis for identifying 
the members which will suffer most. Secondly, market access commitments on the liberalization of trade in services 
are modest. Thus, even though there are few limitations on which members that must be negotiated with, it is not 
likely that this will unduly delay the right to modify commitments.  
77 Art. XXVIII GATT. The categories have been thoroughly explained by several scholars, see, inter alia, Mavroidis 
(2007), supra note 22 at 98-102; Hoda, supra note 7 at 12-14; Bhala, supra note 27 at 320-326; Jackson, supra note 5 
at 230-233. 
For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to note that a member has an INR if it has originally negotiated the specific 
commitment with the modifying member. Due to changes in the modes of tariff negotiations from the bilateral 
request-and-offer approach to linear and sector approaches, the CONTRACTING PARTIES have previously decided 
that any member with a PSI should be deemed to hold an INR. A member with a PSI is a member which has had a 
larger share in the market of the modifying member than the members with an INR. A member may also be deemed 
to have a PSI if the concession in question affects trade which constitutes a major part of the local exports. An 
understanding adopted in the Uruguay Round defines a member with a PSI as the member which has the highest 
ratio of exports affected by the concession. Members with a SI have a significant share in the market of the 
modifying member. In practice, members having 10% or more of the market of the modifying member have been 
considered as having a SI. 




not entail a session of give-and-take, as one may expect in negotiations.79 The 
end effect is not very different if a member unilaterally modifies its 
commitments following consultation and negotiation: All three categories are 
accorded a right of retaliatory modification. Members which are affected, 
but do not have INR, PSI or SI, are not accorded any right to be consulted or 
negotiated with.  
The reason for providing the participation of members with principal supplying 
interest in addition to members having initial negotiating rights is explained in 
the Ad Article XXVIII paragraph 1 to the GATT, balancing the concepts of 
security and flexibility: 
The object (…) is to ensure that a contracting party with a larger share in the trade 
affected by the by the concession than a contracting party with which the 
concessions was originally negotiated shall have an effective opportunity to protect 
the contractual right which it enjoys under this Agreement. On the other hand, it is not 
intended that the scope of the negotiations should be such as to make negotiations 
and agreement unduly difficult.80 
The original text of Article XXVIII GATT left it to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to 
determine which member had negotiation rights.81 According to the 
negotiating history, the purpose was to: 
limit the right of other countries to hold up or delay or prevent the withdrawal or 
modification of the Schedule… any country can claim that it has an interest in any 
item in a Schedule, and if they wish to be difficult, it would be possible for them to 
hold up a modification of the Schedule by claiming an interest in a commodity, their 
interest in which was exceedingly remote… the obvious thing to do was to give the 
right of decision to the CONTRACTING PARTIES… and you could get on with the 
business.82 
                                           
79 Bhala, supra note 27 at 328: “Exchanging information, ideas and possibilities generally is the focus of a consultation, 
while bringing about an arrangement is the goal of a negotiation”. 
80 Interpretative Note Ad Article XXVIII paragraph 1 GATT, para 4. 
81
 The present text of Art. XXVIII GATT was drafted during the Review Session of 1954-1955. The amendments came into 
effect on 7 October 1957. 
82 EPCT/TAC/PV/14, p. 14-15, discussing proposal in EPCT/W/326, cited in Analytical Index. The limitation of negotiation 




The negotiating history confirms that the right of modification is an absolute 
right, not to be unduly delayed, and also explains why the GATT today limits 
negotiation rights to certain categories of WTO members. 
The negotiation and consultation is guided by an overarching principle that 
the members concerned “shall endeavour to maintain a general level of 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions [commitments] not less 
favourable to trade”.83 
3.3.5 The Modifying Member May Have to Participate in Arbitration 
The main difference between modification of the GATT and the GATS is that 
for services, if agreement on compensatory adjustment cannot be reached, 
the matter may be referred to arbitration.84 It follows from the structure of Art. 
XXI GATT that if a timely request for arbitration is submitted, the modifying 
member should not modify its commitment until it receives the arbitrator‟s 
findings.85 If there is no request for arbitration, the modifying member shall be 
free to implement the modification.86 It is vital that any member wishing to 
enforce a right to retaliatory withdrawal participates in the arbitration – or else 
its right to retaliate is precluded.87 A major reason for including arbitration in 
the GATS is that one may avoid situations where panels will be called to judge 
whether the compensation offered was adequate or not.88  
                                           
83 Art. XXVIII:2 GATT and XXI:2(a) GATS. 
84 Art. XXI:3(a) GATS. 
85 S/L/80, supra note 61 at para. 9; Wolfrum et al., supra note 23 at 471.  
86 Art. XXI:3(b) GATS. An example of this was EU‟s enlargement from 15 to 25 member states: Agreement was 
reached with several affected members, but not with others. However, no WTO members referred the matter to 
arbitration and, accordingly, the EC were free to modify their commitments. 
87 Art. XXI:3(a) and 4(b) GATS. However, if an affected member has reached an agreement with the modifying 
member prior to arbitration and decides not to participate in the arbitration, it shall be deemed to have 
participated, see S/L/80, supra note 61 at para. 12. 
88 Matsushita et al., supra note 76 at 674. Arguably, one may also avoid calling on a panel to judge whether 
retaliation was “substantially equivalent” to the modification. 
A further reason may be the fact that Art. XXI essentially leaves it to the modifying member to accept or reject a 
claim for loss of trade and consequent compensation (as compared to Art. XXVIII:1 GATT, where the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES may determine that a member has a PSI or SI). A process of arbitration therefore prevents arbitrary behavior 




3.3.6 Unilateral Modification May Not Precede the Procedural Obligations 
In all GATT and GATS renegotiation procedures, unilateral modification of 
market access commitments is not to precede the required time-intervals, 
notification, consultation/negotiation and potential arbitration.89 
The legal basis for this conclusion is three-fold: Firstly, the wording of both Art. 
XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS implies a specific order in which the modifying 
member must proceed. For instance, in Art. XXI GATS, paragraph 1 requires 
notification; paragraph 2 – negotiations; paragraph 3 – arbitration; and 
paragraphs 3(b) and 4 provide the legal basis for unilateral action. The three 
routes in GATT also imply a procedure of cooperation to be tried before 
unilateral modification, reflecting the principles of multilateralism and 
negotiation.90  
Secondly, the 1947 Geneva Preparatory Conference negotiation history 
supports, at least with regard to „three year‟ renegotiations, that there is a 
need to defer withdrawal until after consultations and negotiations: “[t]he 
intention is... that consultation shall precede the withdrawal of the 
concession... The action will not be taken first and consultation later”.91 
Thirdly, the GATT panel in EEC – Bananas III observed that:  
[A]ccording to Article XXVIII:5, a notification of the intention to modify a tariff binding, 
by itself, does not change the legal status of that binding. Article XXVIII:1, to which 
Article XXVIII:5 refers, stipulates that the modification or withdrawal may occur only after 
negotiation with other relevant contracting parties.92 
In practice, modification of commitments has generally been implemented 
after concluding negotiations with affected members, whether successful or 
                                           
89 Bhala, supra note 27 at 328-329. 
90 Permitting deviation of the procedures would render parts of the provisions somewhat meaningless. This would not 
conform to the interpretative principle of effectiveness: One of the corollaries of the general rule of interpretation of 
Article 31 of the VCLT is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. One may not 
adopt an interpretation which would result in reducing clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility, 
see US – Gasoline (AB), pp. 18, 21; Korea – Dairy (AB), para. 81; Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World 
Trade Organization (2nd edition 2008), p. 203. 
91 EPCT/TAC/PV.14 at p. 13-19 (1947), cited in Analytical Index, supra note 48 at 867. 
92 EEC – Bananas III (GATT panel), para. 133 (emphasis added). The panel was therefore required to examine the 
consistency of the new specific tariffs for bananas with Art. II GATT, notwithstanding the fact that the EEC had 




not. However, there have been some cases in which the modifying member 
proceeded unilaterally after renegotiation had been concluded with most 
but not all members concerned, or in which renegotiations had been in 
progress but no agreement had been reached. It seems that the WTO 
members have been pragmatic regarding the time-limits and chronology for 
renegotiations.93  In a limited number of cases, the commitment was modified 
even before the process of renegotiation had commenced. In these cases, 
obligations towards the relevant categories of members have not been 
observed. While none led to dispute settlement, some led to retaliatory or 
threatened retaliatory modifications. Arguably, additional dispute settlement 
for the violation of affected members‟ procedural rights would be of little 
value, since the obligations‟ disregard would likely only trigger compensation 
or retaliatory modification, something the modifying member would have to 
take into account anyway.94  
3.4 Certain Categories of Affected Members Have a Correlative Right of 
Response to Unilateral Modification 
3.4.1 Overview and Questions 
The right to unilaterally modify a market access commitment comes at a 
price. The essential aim of the procedure is to reach an agreement on 
necessary compensatory adjustment, not in monetary terms but by replacing 
the commitment withdrawn with another. If agreement cannot be reached 
and the modifying member proceeds unilaterally, certain affected members 
have a correlative right of response. 
The right to respond permits categories of affected members to modify 
“substantially equivalent” market access commitments.95 In confrontational 
                                           
93 In a meeting of the Committee of Tariff Concessions it was stressed that “a number of Article XXVIII negotiations 
had become rather protracted… in some circumstances, it might be necessary to proceed with the implementation 
of tariff changes for domestic reasons, before negotiations had been formally concluded, but it should not prevent 
the parties from continuing their efforts to reach an agreed settlement”, see Analytical Index, supra note 48 at 884.    
94 Hoda, supra note 7 at 92. Today, it may be questioned whether such retaliation violates Art. 23.2(a) DSU. This 
provides that members shall not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, except through 
recourse to dispute settlement. 




terms, this last resort of affected members is to retaliate.96 In softer terms, the 
affected members are given the right to modify their commitments in order to 
re-establish the economic equilibrium and the competitive relationship, as 
suggested by the principle of reciprocity.97 
Three questions arise with regard to retaliatory modification: Firstly, which 
members may retaliate? Secondly, to what degree may members retaliate? 
Finally, against which member(s) may retaliatory modifications be targeted – 
only the modifying member or all WTO members? 
3.4.2 Which Members May Retaliate? 
In the GATS, all “affected Members” which have “participated in the 
arbitration” have the right to retaliate, whether or not they have initially 
negotiated the commitment with the modifying member. The wording does 
not distinguish between categories of members; nor does it qualify to what 
degree members must be affected or the affected members‟ relation to the 
modified commitment. A member merely needs to demonstrate that it is 
“affected” in some way or another.98 
For a member to retaliate to a modification of GATT commitments, two 
conditions must be met: Firstly, the affected member must have an INR, PSI or 
SI in the commitment.99 The distinction between the three categories is only 
relevant for the requirement of consultation or negotiation. It could be that 
other members are also affected by the unilateral modification. This raises the 
question of whether they are entitled to react. The terms of Art. XXVIII GATT do 
not acknowledge a right to retaliate for members not falling within the listed 
categories, even if they are affected to a significant degree. Such members 
therefore need to rely on the right to raise non-violation complaints against 
                                           
96 Bhala, supra note 27 at 330.  
97 The travaux préparatoires explains the motivation for including the right to retaliate: “If we wish to take an item out 
of our schedule then clearly it is fair and proper that the countries with whom we negotiate should be free to make 
the corresponding change in their schedules in order to restore the balance… but we want any such exercise to be 
limited to what is corresponding and not to be used in a punitive way”, see EPCT/TAC/PV/14, p. 20.  
98 The differences between the GATT and the GATS probably reflect the practical GATT experience, where affected 
members have retaliated even if they did not fulfil the rather restrictive wording, see below.  




the modifying member. This solution seems warranted given that the 
modifying member has the right to unilaterally modify its commitments; 
hence, its behaviour cannot be deemed a violation.100  
Secondly, in addition to the requirement that the affected member must 
have an INR, PSI or SI, only commitments “initially negotiated” with the 
modifying member may be withdrawn.101 An ordinary meaning of the terms 
suggests that if affected members do not have any commitments initially 
negotiated with the modifying member, they lose the right to retaliate. 
Practice indicates that affected members increase tariffs in retaliation, 
irrespective of whether the tariff concession was initially negotiated with the 
modifying member.102 Although such practice conflicts with the explicit 
wording of Art. XXVIII GATT, no formal challenge against it has yet taken 
place. The practice suggests, then, that this condition has been de facto 
relaxed. While it is unlikely that the WTO panels of the AB will neglect the 
explicit wording of the provisions in case of a dispute, several reasons suggest 
that the “initially negotiated”-requirement should not be interpreted strictly: In 
particular, the modes of negotiation have been significantly altered and the 
requirement may lead to very unreasonable results. 
3.4.3 To Which Degree May Members Retaliate? 
The affected members may withdraw “substantially equivalent” 
commitments. Given that the term “equivalent” is qualified by the term 
“substantially”, the market access commitments modified in retaliation do not 
need to be of equal value of the modified commitment. This is recognition of 
the fact that calculating the exact value of a commitment is a difficult task.  
Art. XXVIII GATT does not further specify the nature of a retaliatory 
modification. In the GATS, however, more direction is given: Any affected 
member which participated in the arbitration may modify substantially 
                                           
100 Mavroidis (2007), supra note 22 at 109.  
101 Art. XXVIII:3 (a), (b), 4(d), 5. 
102 Canada/EC – Article XXVIII Rights (note that the dispute did not address whether this was in conformity with the 




equivalent benefits “in conformity with those findings [i.e. the arbitrator‟s 
award]”.103 
Guidance to the term “substantially equivalent” in GATT is found in Ad Article 
XXVIII paragraph 1 (concerning renegotiation): 
It is not intended that [participation in renegotiation] should have the effect that it 
[the modifying member] should have to pay compensation or suffer retaliation 
greater than the withdrawal of modification sought, judged in light of the conditions 
of trade at the time of the proposed withdrawal or modification.104 
The Ad note is a restatement of the principles of reciprocity and 
proportionality: If retaliation exceeds adjustment, the economic equilibrium is 
upset and the outcome unfair. A disproportionate response may work as an 
incentive not to modify commitments, but this is not what the WTO members 
intended; the provisions provide for absolute rights which are not to be unduly 
hampered. The notions of reciprocity and proportionality therefore govern the 
response of affected members on two levels: Firstly, reciprocity is largely the 
reason why affected members are permitted to respond. Secondly, 
reciprocity and proportionality are then used to moderate and discipline the 
response of affected members. 
Despite these guidelines, there is still room for disagreement as to whether the 
proposed retaliation will disturb the previous equilibrium.  
3.4.4 Against Which Members May Affected Members Retaliate? 
A unilateral modification must be made on a MFN basis – it may not 
discriminate between its trading partners.105 The AB has also clarified that the 
MFN principle applies to compensatory commitments agreed upon during 
                                           
103 Art. XXI:4(b) GATS. A reason for including this clause may be that it essentially eliminates the need to call on a 
panel to determine whether retaliation is “substantially equivalent” to the commitments withdrawn. This may prove 
necessary in the GATT. 
104 Interpretative Note Ad Article XXVIII paragraph 1, para. 6. The travaux préparatoires stressed that “we want any 
such exercise [retaliatory modification] to be limited to what is corresponding and not to be used in a punitive way”, 
see EPCT/TAC/PV/14, p. 20. 
105
 The term MFN is used in this context to describe that the modification is implemented against all WTO members on 
a non-discriminatory basis. This is not the ordinary usage of the term, according to which any advantage granted to 
products or services originating in one country, must immediately and unconditionally be accorded to the like 




renegotiation.106 A more disputed question is whether retaliatory modification 
default of compensatory commitments may be implemented vis-à-vis the 
modifying member only, on a bilateral basis, or whether it too must be 
implemented vis-à-vis all members, on an erga omnes basis. 
The GATS prescribes explicitly that retaliatory modification may be 
implemented “solely with respect to the modifying Member”.107   
The equivalent GATT provision does not address this question. It could be 
argued that the MFN principle in Article I GATT must then apply. However, an 
examination of the wording suggests that this is not obvious. The principle 
refers to “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity”. Upon retaliation by 
an affected member, the modifying member is accorded neither, and 
retaliation on a MFN basis, rather than internationalizing an advantage, would 
simply spread a disadvantage which the modifying member has agreed to 
pay for. 
A contextual interpretation implies that retaliation should be done on a 
bilateral basis: Firstly, the yardstick for renegotiation is that the parties should 
“endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade”.108 This wording 
reflects not only an obligation to the economic equilibrium, but also to the 
general level of trade. Unilateral modification and consequent retaliation on 
a bilateral level is arguably less harmful to trade than if retaliation were to be 
done on an erga omnes basis. Secondly, GATS explicitly prohibits retaliation 
on an erga omnes basis. This may, with regard to GATT, be interpreted in two 
ways: The fact that GATS explicitly prohibits erga omnes retaliation, and GATT 
does not, may be interpreted a contrario to signify that erga omnes 
                                           
106 EC – Poultry (AB); EC – Poultry (panel). Brazil argued that the MFN principle did not apply to tariff-rate quotas 
resulting from compensation negotiations under Art. XXVIII GATT. The panel rejected this argument and held that this 
view “would create a serious loophole in the multilateral trading system. Such a result would fundamentally alter the 
overall balance of concessions Article XXVIII is designed to achieve”, cf. para. 215. The AB agreed that a tariff-rate 
quota resulting from Article XXVIII-negotiations must be administered in a non-discriminatory manner: “We see 
nothing in Article XXVIII to suggest that compensation negotiated within its framework may be exempt from 
compliance with the non-discrimination principle”, cf. para. 100. 
107 Art. XXI:4 GATS. 




retaliation is indeed permitted under GATT. Contextually, however, the fact 
that GATS prohibits erga omnes retaliation supports an equal interpretation of 
GATT. Considering the similarities between the GATT and GATS provisions, and 
the fact that Art. XXI GATT was modelled after Art. XXVIII GATT, the latter 
interpretation is sounder. Finally, retaliation as permitted by Art. 22 DSU may 
only be done against the member maintaining an illegal measure, and not all 
WTO members. 109 
Practice suggests differently: There are traceable incidents where the 
GATT/WTO member reacting to unilateral modification threatened to do so 
on an erga omnes basis.110 Also statements from the negotiation history 
supports the view that retaliation may be implemented vis-à-vis all 
members.111 Retaliatory modification against only the modifying member 
may, moreover, lead to a fragmentation of the WTO system of market access 
commitments. Several scholars maintain that retaliation must be done on an 
erga omnes basis.112 
Although the law is not clear, the practice may give rise for concern: If an 
affected member retaliates on an erga omnes basis, innocent bystanders 
have to pay a price for the modifying member‟s unilateral modification.113 
Erga omnes retaliation may, moreover, lead to an endless circle of counter-
retaliation which the current legal framework is ill equipped to deal with.114 
                                           
109 The fact that retaliation for violations may only be done against the member in breach, does not necessarily 
support a similar conclusion for retaliatory modification for two reasons: Firstly, retaliation in DS is against an illegality; 
secondly, and importantly, retaliation in DS is a temporary measure, whereas retaliatory modification is permanent. 
Hudec maintains that “GATT/WTO rules should be interpreted to require that all permanent trade measures be made 
on an MFN basis”, Robert Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute settlement, in Friedel Weiss & 
Jochem Wiers, eds, Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures 345 (2000), note 39.  
110 The 1990 arbitration award on Canada /EC – Article XXVIII Rights recognized that Canada, the party affected by 
an EC modification, had the right to raise duties also vis-à-vis the rest of its trading partners on an erga omnes basis 
when retaliating against the EEC: “Should Canada exercise her right to withdraw concessions, she undertakes 
obligations to compensate third countries having negotiated rights in respect of Canada for the products on which 
concessions would be withdrawn”. See DS12/R, 37S/80, p. 86; Analytical Index, supra note 48 at 875. 
111 EPCT/TAC/PV/18, p. 44: “[i]t is probably not desirable to carry it beyond the stage of original action and 
countermeasures... If unfairness does result from the practical action of those measures, it will have to be sorted out 
by the [CONTRACTING PARTIES]”. 
112 Inter alia, Hoda, supra note 7 at 95; Hudec, supra note 109 at 25. Other scholars disagree, see inter alia Mavroidis 
(2007), supra note 22 at 106, holding that “it should be the case that retaliating WTO members should do so only on a 
bilateral basis”. 
113 From the perspective of the bystander, this amounts to a violation of Art. II GATT, and it is questionable whether 
Art. XXVIII GATT was meant to condone such practices. 
114 Arguably, Art. XXVIII GATT may not be available for renegotiations between retaliating members and innocent 




Finally, the prospect of counter-retaliation by innocent bystanders may work 
as disincentives for members wishing or needing to modify their commitments. 
This is not in conformity with the contracting parties‟ intention.115 
4. UNILATERAL MODIFICATION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
WTO members affected by a unilateral modification of commitments are not 
only protected by the specific retaliation provided for in Art. XXVIII GATT and 
XXI GATS. Arguably, there is still the possibility of the non-violation complaint 
and, in cases where the procedural requirements are not observed, even the 
violation complaint. Finally, the scope of retaliatory modification may give rise 
to disagreement and dispute.  
It may be questioned why the WTO has provided for specific retaliation, and 
still other possibilities. An explanation may be the different nature of the legal 
entitlements provided in Art. XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS.116 The subject of the 
provisions, concessions and commitments, are largely bilateral and reciprocal 
in nature, and may therefore be adequately protected by the „rebalancing‟ 
provided in these provisions. The procedural entitlements, however, are owed 
to a larger group of members and are, moreover, particularly difficult to 
„monetize‟ or quantify for the sake of rebalancing. It is hard to see how 
rebalancing can be achieved where positive, non-reciprocated 
commitments such as procedural rules are infringed upon.117  
The possibility of retaliatory modification also raises questions as to the 
relationship between retaliation pursuant to modification provisions and 
retaliation following dispute settlement.  
                                           
115 Mavroidis (2007), supra note 22 at 106-108. 
116 The nature of WTO obligations and commitments will be examined in section 5. 
117 Simon A.B. Scropp, Revisiting the “Compliance-Vs.-Rebalancing” Debate in WTO Scholarship: Towards a Unified 
Research Agenda, HEI Working Paper No: 29/2007, p. 18; Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the 
WTO: Rules Are Rules – Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 American Journal of International Law 335 (2000) 
(hereinafter Pauwelyn 2000), p. 342;  John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: 
Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 American Journal of International Law 109 (2004) (hereinafter 




4.2 Retaliatory Modification and Retaliation in Dispute Settlement: 
Differences, Similarities and Consequences Thereof 
Suspension of commitments (referred to as „retaliation‟) is a measure that may 
be implemented as an answer to unilateral modification, but also in the event 
that the recommendations and rulings of DS panels and the AB are not 
implemented within a reasonable period of time.118 There are several 
differences between retaliation in the two different settings, but the similarities 
are striking.119   
Retaliation differs firstly with regard to duration: Retaliation in DS is a 
temporary measure, whereas retaliatory modification of commitments is 
permanent.120   
Secondly, the multilateral involvement and control differs to a certain degree: 
In a disputed setting, unilateral behaviour in the determination that a violation 
has occurred, is prohibited.121 Retaliation in DS also requires the “authorization 
of the DSB”.122 Furthermore, the level of retaliation may be referred to 
arbitration.123  Retaliatory modification is generally determined unilaterally by 
the affected member. Some similarities exist, however: Art. XXVIII:4 GATT 
requires the involvement of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.124 Also, for services, 
affected members must participate in arbitration in order to retaliate, and 
must retaliate in conformity with those findings. The difference in multilateral 
involvement may possibly be explained by differences in regulatory aims: 
Whereas the modification provisions are intra-contractual, permissible, 
                                           
118 Art. 22.1 DSU. 
119 The negotiating history suggests that the original GATT DS article was entangled or merged with what is now the 
escape clause (Art. XIX GATT). However, the two were distinctly separated in the drafting process.   
120 In DS, retaliation does not end the matter. It is a temporary instrument to achieve the ultimate goal of compliance 
or mutually agreed settlement. Suspension is not a permanent rebalancing of concessions, as in renegotiations, but a 
temporary solution that must be ended if WTO rulings are implemented or a settlement reached.   
121 Art. 23.2 DSU. 
122 Art. 22.2 DSU. Since the DSB decides on such request by reverse consensus, the granting of authorization is 
automatic. 
123 Art. 22.6 DSU. 
124 In Art. XXVIII:4 GATT, the involvement of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is as follows: (i) They must authorize the 
modifying member to enter into renegotiations; they may prescribe the time-line for renegotiations; the matter may 
be referred to the them; they may upon such referral submit their views; and they may determine that the modifying 
member has failed to offer adequate compensation. The CONTRACTING PARTIES also determine which members 
have principal supplying interests, cf. Art. XXVIII:1. The CONTRACTING PARTIES decide by consensus, as opposed to 




flexibility mechanisms, DS is concerned with enforcement of extra-contractual 
behaviour.125 
Thirdly, in DS, the choice of the object of retaliation is subject to principles and 
procedures, e.g. for cross-retaliation. The choice of retaliatory modification is, 
on the other hand largely non-regulated.126  
Finally, retaliation following a unilateral modification may be implemented 
almost instantly and, indeed, must be implemented within a certain period of 
time.127 In DS, the member in breach may have a “reasonable period of time” 
to implement the recommendations and rulings, and retaliation may only 
occur after the expiry of this time.128 The reasonable period of time may be 
significant. 
As to the similarities, the level of retaliation in DS shall be “equivalent” to the 
level of nullification or impairment.129 According to Art. XXVIII GATT and XXI 
GATS, the retaliatory modification shall be “substantially equivalent”. While 
the WTO has set more ambitious goals concerning DS than the GATT, the one 
WTO/GATT instrument to achieve those goals has been weakened, from 
“appropriate” retaliation (Art. XXIII GATT) to “equivalent” retaliation (Art. 22.4 
DSU).130 Somewhat surprisingly, intra- and extra-contractual behaviour may be 
remedied in essentially the same way. The WTOA thereby nearly reduces the 
distinction between lawful and prohibited behaviour to legalistic formality, 
                                           
125 Schropp, supra note 117 at 27, sorts GATT and GATS provisions into three levels: The primary rules comprise of 
substantive obligations in the form of market access commitments, and contracting provisions aimed at maintaining 
and stabilizing the initially agreed-upon level of bilateral cooperation (non-discrimination, prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions etc.). The secondary rules lay down how, and how rigidly, an initial concession is to be protected from ex 
post discretion. Art. XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS would fit in such category. While the primary and secondary rules 
delineate intra-contractual, permissible, behaviour, the tertiary rules accord how to sanction extra-contractual, 
uncooperative behaviour.   
126 The difference may be less than what it appears to be. Since the DSU deals with the multitude of the WTO 
Agreements, issues like cross-retaliation needs to be regulated. This is less necessary for retaliatory modification within 
one and the same agreement, although questions of cross-retaliation may arise for retaliatory modification as well, 
see below in section 4.4. 
127 Cf. e.g. Art. XXVIII:3 GATT: “after 30 days”, “no later than six months”. 
128 Art. 22.2 DSU. 
129 Art. 22.4 DSU. 
130 Joost Pauwelyn, How Binding Are WTO Rules? A Transatlantic Analysis of International Law, Presentation at 
Tübingen University 14-16 October 2004 (hereinafter Pauwelyn 2004), p. 14. The WTO has led to an increased 
possibility of retaliation in DS, given that retaliation became automatic in the sense that there is no need for 
consensus. In return, however, the level of retaliation seems to be lower. 
Arguably, too much is now expected from retaliation: It is seen as an instrument to rebalance, to compensate, to 




leading to several potentially negative results: Firstly, a member may wish to 
violate its obligations rather than engaging in renegotiations pursuant to Art. 
XXVIII GATT or XXI GATS. Indeed, due to the similarities of the remedies and the 
fact that retaliation in DS is not immediate, violation may be penalized less 
than if the member resorts to the de iure flexibility mechanisms.131 Secondly, 
the similarity of the remedy has also contributed to confusion as to the object 
and purpose of DS.132 This is dealt with in Section 5. 
4.3 Non-Violation and Retaliatory Modification  
It is argued above that affected members which may not retaliate must avail 
themselves of the non-violation complaint.133 The non-violation complaint, as 
conceived by drafters and applied by the members, serves to protect the 
balance of tariff concessions:134 
[The purpose of XXIII:1(b) is] to protect the balance of concessions under GATT by 
providing a means to redress government actions not otherwise regulated by GATT 
rules that nonetheless nullify or impair a Member‟s legitimate expectations of benefits 
from tariff negotiations.135 
Indeed, the object and purpose, as described by the GATT panel in Oil Seeds, 
also resemble those mentioned above in section 2: 
[T]he idea underlying [XXIII:1b] is that the improved competitive opportunities that can 
be legitimately expected from a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by 
measures proscribed by the General Agreement but also by measures consistent with 
that Agreement. In order to encourage contracting parties to make tariff concessions 
they must therefore be given a right of redress when a reciprocal concession is 
impaired by another contracting party as a result of the application of any measure, 
whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement.136 
                                           
131 Schropp, supra note 117 at 41. 
132 Pauwelyn, supra note 130 at 19; Schropp, supra note 117 at 26. 
133 Cf. section 3.4.2 above. The non-violation complaint follows from Art. XXIII:1(b) GATT and 26 DSU. 
134 Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, International Law, International Organizations 
and Dispute Settlement (1997), p. 173. 
135 Japan – Film (panel report), para. 1050.   





There is no obligation to withdraw the non-violating measure. Rather, the 
panel or AB shall recommend that the member concerned make “a mutually 
satisfactory adjustment”.137 Although the text is not entirely clear, the 
adjustment may potentially involve retaliation. Thus, retaliation in both non-
violation complaints and in the case of unilateral modification may be 
regarded as a final settlement: Under Art. XXVIII, the modifying member may 
permanently maintain the unbound concession for which retaliation is 
compensatory adjustment. This also seems to be the end-effect in non-
violation cases, because the respondent is neither required to withdraw the 
measure or offer compensation, thus leaving retaliation as a response that will 
end the matter should the respondent choose not to remove the measure.138 
The similarities between the non-violation complaint and unilateral 
modification support Ernst Ulrich Petersmann‟s contention that “non-violation 
complaints supplement GATT Article XXVIII as well as GATS Article XXI and 
serve to prevent their circumvention”.139 
4.4 Modification in a Disputed Setting 
Following the DS proceedings in US – Gambling, the US notified the WTO of its 
intention to exclude cross border internet gambling and betting services from 
its schedule of commitments pursuant to Art. XXI GATS.140 This is the first case in 
which GATS schedules are modified in a disputed setting.  
In relation to the GATT, modification of schedules in a disputed setting is not 
unheard of. The EC withdrew concessions after an unfavourable ruling in EC – 
Poultry, and the reconvened panel in EEC – Oilseeds II considered that an 
                                           
137 Art. 26.1(b) DSU.   
138 Hudec, supra note 109 at note 39. 
139 Petersmann, supra note 134 at 173. 
140 It is interesting to note that the US does not speak of modification but of clarification of concessions because, 
according to the US, it had never intended to include internet gambling when offering full commitments for 
recreational services, an argument which the AB did not buy, thus confirming the binding nature of commitments, cf. 




appropriate way to eliminate the impairment of a tariff concession was to 
enter into a renegotiation of the tariff concession under Article XXVIII.141 
There is little doubt that, pursuant to the wording of GATS and DSU, the US has 
the right to modify its commitment, even in a disputed setting, provided that it 
follows the procedural requirements.142 Nevertheless, unilateral modification in 
a disputed setting raises several questions, e.g. whether the US‟ recourse to 
Art. XXI GATS precludes retaliation under Art. 22 DSU, whether Antigua may still 
cross-retaliate under Art. XXI GATS and whether the US‟ recourse to Art. XXI 
GATS may be considered an act in bad faith, or infringes Antigua‟s legitimate 
expectations. The questions will remain unanswered here. 
5. UNILATERAL MODIFICATION AND THE NATURE OF WTO COMMITMENTS 
AND OBLIGATIONS 
5.1 Setting the Stage: The Compliance vs. Rebalancing Debate 
For over a decade, a debate has been simmering among WTO scholars 
which at face value concerns the object and purpose of enforcement of 
WTO rules and the legal bindingness of dispute settlement reports. The debate 
was triggered by an editorial comment by Judith Hippler Bello: 
Like the GATT rules that preceded them, the WTO rules are simply not „binding‟ in the 
traditional sense… The only sacred, inviolable aspect of the GATT was the overall 
balance of rights and obligations, of benefits and burdens, achieved among 
members through negotiations… To put it simply, a government could renege on its 
negotiated commitment not to exceed a specified tariff on an item, provided it 
restored the overall balance of GATT concessions through compensatory reductions in 
tariffs on other items… The WTO substantially improved the GATT rules for settling 
disputes but did not alter the fundamental nature of the negotiated bargain among 
sovereign member states… The only sacred WTO imperative is to maintain that 
balance so as to maintain political support for the WTO Agreement by members.143 
                                           
141 EEC – Oilseeds II (GATT panel), para. 92. The difference between US – Gambling and EC – Poultry is reportedly that 
the EC modified its commitments only after having formally complied with the panel‟s and AB‟s ruling. 
142 Pauwelyn, WTO Condemnation of U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling Pits Free Trade Against Moral Values, ASIL insights, 
November 2004, argued that “[i]f necessary, the United States can always renegotiate its GATS commitments and 
withdraw the one on internet gambling… All it needs to do is offer equivalent compensation or accept reciprocal 
trade retaliation by Antigua”.  
143 Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 American Journal of International Law 




In an answer to Hippler Bello‟s editorial comment, John Jackson refuted her 
views and argued that WTO obligations, in the context of a dispute settlement 
ruling, are legally binding.144  
It soon became obvious that the two commentators‟ contentions were 
representative of two schools of thought, the „rebalancing‟ and the 
„compliance‟ schools.145 The discord has also been termed “property vs. 
liability rules”. 146 
In generalizing terms, rebalancing scholars maintain that a WTO member may 
choose not to come into compliance with its WTO obligations – preferring 
instead to provide compensation or suffer retaliating.147 The compliance 
school contends that the objective of WTO enforcement is to induce strict 
and prompt compliance with WTO obligations, and to deter future 
violations.148 A third perspective, inalienability, views WTO as a global trade 
constitution, protected by an unconditional rule of immutability, which ties the 
hands of trade policy makers who may otherwise be tempted to heed to 
domestic protectionist pressure.149 
                                           
144 Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding - Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 
American Journal of International Law 60 (1997) (hereinafter Jackson 1997), p. 60-64.  
145 Schropp, supra note 117 at 5. 
146 Ibid, at note 5. 
147 Judith Hippler Bello, Book Review, 95 American Journal of International Law 984 (2001) (hereinafter Bello 2001), p. 
986-987. 
The rebalancing school is rooted in a conviction that the WTO consists of reciprocal promises of market access, 
giving rise to an overarching balance of rights and obligations. The WTO is accordingly best conceptualized as a 
“web of bilateral equilibria”, and enforcement of WTO obligations is equivalent to restoring the balance of 
commitment level in case the equilibrium is disturbed, cf. Schropp, supra note 117 at 7. 
Rebalancing scholars tend to draw from the discipline of law and economics, and some utilize analogies from 
American economic theory of private commercial contracts. In contract theory parlance, rebalancing reflects a 
„liability rule‟ perspective on ex post escape from contractual obligations. Under a pure liability rule, the promisor 
wishing to deviate from its obligations may do so without the permission of any adversely affected promisee, but is 
liable for the damage as a result, see Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 6 at 182; Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules and inalienability: One view of the Cathedral, 85 Harvard Law Review (1972), p. 1092-93; Kaplow & 
Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harvard Law Review (1996), p. 715.  
148 The compliance school is deeply rooted in the discipline of public international law, and scholars rely mainly on 
treaty interpretation. For compliance advocates, the permissible manner of ex post escape from contractual 
obligations is via renegotiations under the purview of provisions like Art. XXVIII GATT, Art. XXI GATS and Art. X WTOA.  
In contract theory parlance, the compliance perspective reflects a „property rule‟, whereby the parties to a contract 
are under a strict obligation to perform, and a failure to do so will be punished severely. However, the promisor can 
still avoid its commitments by securing permission from the promisee, usually by paying for it, see Schwartz & Sykes, 
supra note 6 at 182; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 147 at 715; Schropp, supra note 117 at 12-13. The term „property 
rule‟ comes from analogy to tangible property rights. 
149 Inalienability acknowledges that there are other stakes in the system than merely state interests. The predictability 
and stability of the world trading system advantages also non-state actors who are normally under-represented in 




The existence of provisions allowing members to unilaterally modify their 
commitments has been used as an argument by the rebalancing school of 
thought150, and gives rise to questions as to whether WTO obligations, in 
general, and WTO commitments, in particular, are binding. This section 
examines the nature of WTO obligations and commitments in light of the 
debate. 
5.2 The Right to Unilaterally Modify Commitments Does Not Change the 
Binding Nature of WTO Obligations 
The argument of the rebalancing school that WTO obligations are simply not 
binding, suffers from one major weakness: It draws conclusions on the binding 
nature of all WTO entitlements on the basis of the intra-contractual flexibility 
that is explicitly agreed upon for market access commitments.  
The flexibility provided by Art. XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS is limited by the 
explicit wording to two categories of WTO entitlements: WTO members may 
unilaterally modify GATT “concessions” and GATS “commitments”. According 
to the AB, the ordinary meaning of the terms suggests that “a member may 
yield rights and grant benefits, but it cannot diminish its obligations”.151 A 
member cannot, then, reduce its other WTO obligations by unilaterally 
modifying its commitments pursuant to Art. XXVIII GATT and XXI GATS. 152 
The rebalancing school reduces the WTO to a single-entitlement treaty in 
which reciprocal market access and liberalization commitments are 
exchanged. This perspective equates initially exchanged entitlements with 
other WTO obligations, and even the rationale for the WTOA. Rebalancing 
                                           
150 ”Article XXVIII authorized trading partners to renegotiate tariff levels when local politics or a change in the 
domestic economy required it. The only sacred, inviolable aspect of the GATT was the overall balance…”, see Bello 
(1996), supra note 143 at 417. 
151 EC – Bananas III (AB), para. 154; EC – Poultry (AB), para. 98; US – Restrictions on Imports of Sugar (GATT panel), 
para. 5.2. 
152 Another reason why unilateral modification of market access commitments does not change the binding nature 
of WTO obligations is that the range of obligations that can be assumed through entries into schedules is limited. 
Members cannot include commitments which fall outside the legal framework of the GATT and GATS. GATT 
concessions must be accorded to “commerce” (Article II:1 GATT) while GATS commitments must be accorded to 




proponents are mistaken when equating the two: The WTOA comprises of 
more rights and obligations than solely the market access entitlement.153  
The GATT and GATS themselves are not simply a codification of commitments. 
In addition to the commitments that are annexed to these agreements, they 
contain a series of other obligations that together represent a code of 
conduct. Modifying a commitment does not make the other obligations any 
less valid: For instance, the commitments, renegotiation and unilateral 
modification must be administered in a non-discriminatory manner.154 The AB 
saw “nothing in Article XXVIII [GATT] to suggest that compensation negotiated 
within this framework may be exempt from compliance with the non-
discrimination principle”.155 That the modification provisions do not make WTO 
obligations any less binding also finds support in the negotiation history:  
[T]here is only a question here of withdrawal of concessions; there is no question of 
discriminatory measures against a particular country… this is, so to speak, a negotiation 
in reverse… the intent is clear: that in no way should this Article interfere with the 
operation of the MFN clause.156 
While a special and increased reciprocal relationship clearly exists with 
respect to market access commitments, essential other entitlements in the 
WTO legal order may not be explained as the result of an individual giving 
and taking as part of negotiations.157 The WTO is a multi-entitlement 
agreement, and consists at least of (i) the reciprocal market access 
entitlements; (ii) minimum standards, which are owed to all members and 
inexplicable by the logic of reciprocal tariff concessions; and (iii) auxiliary 
entitlements, like procedural rules, transparency requirements and obligations 
owed to the institution itself.158 WTO agreements such as the SPS or the TRIPS 
are unrelated to the idea of balancing trade concessions which are, like in 
                                           
153 Schropp, supra note 117 at 18, 20-21. 
154  Indeed, the obligations of non-discrimination apply regardless of whether or not obligations to liberalize exists in 
the relevant sector, see Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at 35. 
155 EC – Poultry (AB), para. 100. 
156 GATT Analytical Index, supra note 48 at 874. 
157 Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at 48. 




the GATT and GATS, additional to the rules set out in the agreement itself. The 
rationale for adjustment of the bilateral-contractual balance of commitments 
has therefore become less relevant.159 Indeed, many of the obligations in the 
WTOA are not dependent on the level of market access commitments at all. 
While some WTO obligations are concessionary, i.e. the subject of reciprocal 
exchange, others are absolute.160 Thus, the binding nature of WTO obligations 
in general remains untouched by the possibility of unilateral modification of 
commitments. 
Finally, the juridical alignment of the dispute settlement mechanism and the 
general prohibition of unilateral measures within the WTO have been 
understood as a step towards a more rule-oriented WTO. WTO members have 
not, by virtue of agreeing on provisions permitting unilateral modification, 
given up their right to challenge the consistency of modified schedules with 
the multilateral rules.161 There is also little doubt that WTO members are bound 
under international law by the WTO agreements.162 
The rebalancing school cannot be termed a complete theory on the binding 
nature of WTO obligations and enforcement. Rather, it is a theory about 
market access-related flexibility. When rebalancing scholars state that WTO 
rules are not binding in the traditional sense, they may actually intend to say 
                                           
159 Joost Pauwelyn, The Nature of WTO Obligations, Jean Monnet Working Paper (1/2002) (hereinafter Pauwelyn 
2002), p. 35. The fact that negotiating WTO agreements continue to be a balancing exercise of give and take – in 
which, e.g., developing countries accept the TRIPS in exchange for agreements in agriculture and textiles – does not 
warrant a continued and exclusive focus on bilateral balances. 
160 Carmody, supra note 14 at 5. Another way to view WTO obligations is the distinction between reciprocal and 
integral obligations. To affect or alter a bilateral relationship does not normally impinge on other bilateral 
relationships, and their breach can only be invoked by the member(s) at the other end of the reciprocal relationship. 
The binding effect of integral obligations, of which there are many in the WTO, on the other hand, is collective in 
nature. To affect or alter an integral norm will necessarily have an impact on all members bound by that norm, see 
Pauwelyn, supra note 159 at 12. Market access commitments may be viewed as the former kind of obligation, non-
discrimination as the latter. That may be an additional reason why modification of a member‟s MFN obligation 
requires a waiver, whilst market access commitments may be modified unilaterally. 
The new issues areas of the WTO, like TRIMS, TRIPS, ILP may be seen as accords based on motivation quite distinct 
from the reciprocal exchange of market access. They have a multilateral ambit. They reflect not a quid pro quo, but 
are owned by the entire membership. As an example, the non-establishment of a functioning patent office impairs 
the competitive opportunities of all other members. 
161 Mavroidis (2007), supra note 22 at 113. 
162 Jackson (1997), supra note 144 at 60; Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at 40. 
The obligation to comply with WTO rules reflects the principle of pacta sunt servanda. From an inalienability 
perspective, compliance also protects the stakes of the economy and the private operators affected by the system, 
see Thomas Cottier & Matthias Oesch, International Trade Regulation: Law and Policy in the WTO, the European 




that previously negotiated market access commitments are not strictly 
binding, and are protected by a liability rule of flexibility. This may be a 
“different ballgame”, and an important qualification in the applicability of the 
rebalancing perspective.163   
5.3 Are Market Access Commitments Binding? 
Since market access commitments may be modified unilaterally, this triggers 
the question of whether commitments are binding.  
In an article jointly authored by Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, the 
economic theory of contract remedies is applied to the renegotiation 
provisions and dispute settlement.164 Schwartz and Sykes conclude that 
market access commitments are ultimately protected by a „liability rule‟:165 A 
member may modify its commitments unilaterally, but is liable for the 
modification. The liability is specified as the retaliation by affected members 
of “substantially equivalent” commitments.166 The authors believe that the 
members have ultimately agreed on a liability rule out of “the desire to 
facilitate efficient breach and in the relative superiority of a liability rule to 
approach that task”.167  
Both the method and results of the authors may be subjected to critical 
discussion.168 Since WTO members have explicitly agreed on permitting 
                                           
163 Schropp, supra note 117 at 21–22. 
164 The theory proposes that a key objective of an enforcement system is to “induce a party to comply with its 
obligations whenever compliance will yield greater benefits to the promisee than costs to the promisor, while 
allowing the promisor to depart from its obligations whenever the cost of compliance to the promisor exceed the 
benefits of the promisee (...) the objective is to deter inefficient breaches but to encourage efficient ones”, Schwartz 
& Sykes, supra note 6 at 181; Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (2000), chapters 5 and 6.   
165 Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 6 at 187. 
166 The authors note that “the system consistently employs liability rules rather than property rules” and that the 
renegotiation provisions “stop short of creating a property rule”, ibid at 183, 185.  
Schropp, supra note 117 at 26 states that Art. XXVIII:3 GATT “effectively renders the previous renegotiation clause 
futile”. This reflects neither the wording nor sequencing of the procedural requirements, nor the actual application of 
the provision by members. 
167 Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 6 at 187. 
168 Concerning method, Jackson(2004) warns against overstraining analogies from domestic private law 
jurisprudence and of incorporating them into the international law context, since parties of interest, institutional 
settings and contextual circumstances are usually so fundamentally different, supra note  117 at 111. Several 
concerns may be raised:  
Firstly, economic models of contractual relationships assume extremely simplistic game settings, usually featuring two 
and not 153 parties, one and not multiple entitlements, and a stationary contracting environment. Reality is largely 
abstracted from. By comparing the WTO to simple sales contracts, explanatory scope may be lost and wrong 




unilateral modification, the value of examining efficient breach may be 
limited, and must at any rate be done by incomplete contract theory which 
gives rise to concern as to the accuracy of the results. Nonetheless, used 
cautiously, contract theory may provide insights into the optimal protection of 
market access commitments, and may provide insights into making 
renegotiation and unilateral modification as efficient as possible. 
While economic (and political economic) theory may explain the optimal 
protection of commitments, the bindingness of commitments must be a 
normative or legal question. Although the binding nature of commitments 
may be assessed by virtue of their legal protection and enforcement, this is 
not necessarily so. Rather, the legally binding nature of WTO rules must be 
distinguished from the agreed-upon flexibility mechanisms and the 
consequences entailed by breaching those rules. 
Articles II:7 GATT and XX:3 GATS prescribe that the schedules of commitments 
are an “integral part” of the GATT and GATS. According to the AB, 
“[schedules of commitments] represent a common agreement among all 
members”.169 The commitments are not seen as purely concessionary of 
bilateral-contractual, but rather as the result of the common intention of all 
WTO members. 170 Commitments are therefore in principle binding in the same 
sense as obligations deriving directly from the agreements. 
                                                                                                                                   
Secondly, the participant/beneficiary differs: In a commercial contract, the participants and beneficiaries are most 
likely the same. By contrast, in the WTO, the parties are governments, whereas the potential beneficiaries may be 
traders and individuals, see Jackson (2004), supra note 117 at 118-119. Of course, governments may heed their 
interests, but there is a difference between public choice and rational choice. 
Thirdly, rebalancing proponents use an inconsistent terminology. Indeed, terms like breach, violation and 
enforcement are used in a cooperative, intra-contractual context, see Schropp, supra note 117 at 21.  
Concerning result, Schwartz & Sykes underplay the important „property rule‟-elements in the modification provisions. 
Both de iure and de facto, renegotiation is necessary and preferred. It should also be noted that the WTO members 
have significantly reduced the potential costs and hold-up problems that embracing a „property rule‟ may have 
created. Moreover, it is questionable whether Art. XXVIII GATT encourages efficient adjustment, cf. Pauwelyn, supra 
note 130 at 36. 
169 EC – Computer Equipment (AB), para. 84. 
170 EC – Computer Equipment (AB), para. 84.  EC – Poultry (AB), para. 82; Canada –  Dairy (AB), paras 131-133; Korea 




Moreover, between the open seasons for renegotiation, the firm validity of 
GATT concessions is affirmed.171 A member is required to fulfil its obligations 
notwithstanding any deterioration of its economic conditions, hardship or 
force majeure during the stipulated time period.172 
The fact that commitments may be changed at the will of any member, does 
not make the commitments any less binding for one additional reason; 
unilateral modification is explicitly agreed upon and provided for in the GATT 
and the GATS. In other words, unilateral modification is a conduct which is 
expressly governed by the WTO legal order and is mirrored by respective 
procedures and instruments as provided by the WTO agreements.173 Within this 
set of rules, it is then up to the members to decide whether and when to 
engage in renegotiations, and any bargains struck are implemented subject 
to these rules.174 If commitments were not legally binding, there would be no 
reason to include the provisions permitting renegotiation and unilateral 
modification. Indeed, rather than diminishing the binding nature of 
commitments, the provisions permitting unilateral modifications confirm their 
binding nature. The provisions would not be necessary if freedom to 
unilaterally modify the commitments existed anyway. 
Whereas international trade rests on comparative costs and benefits, the 
foundation of international trade law is, in the last resort, the categorical 
imperative of pacta sunt servanda.175 Unilateral modification of market 
access commitments is expressly agreed upon, and does not diminish the 
binding nature of the commitments themselves or other WTO obligations. 
                                           
171 This does not apply to the GATS commitments, which may be modified at any time after three years have lapsed 
since the entry into force of the commitment, see section 3.3.2 above. 
172 M Rafiqul Islam, International Trade Law of the WTO (2006), p. 364-365. It may even be questionable whether the 
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“special circumstances”, se Article XXVIII:4 and 5. 
173 Stoll & Schorkopf, supra note 19 at 41. 
174 Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 28 at 48.  




5.4 Returning to the Stage: Concluding Remarks on Rebalancing and 
Compliance 
If one isolates multilateral entitlements from reciprocal market access 
commitments, rebalancing and compliance may be seen as 
complementary. Rebalancing is, indeed, provided for in the renegotiation 
provisions. Compliance, on the other hand, should be the central element of 
extra-contractual enforcement. The market access commitments may be 
optimally protected by a liability-type rule. Nonetheless, the fact that both 
GATT and GATS provide for flexibility for these entitlements, does not change 
the binding nature of WTO commitments or obligations. 
Rather than having to choose between compliance or rebalancing, property 
or liability rules, a way forward may be to agree on when compliance is the 
optimal goal and when liability protection is more suitable, depending on the 
WTO obligations in question.176 
6. CONCLUSION 
Rules on market access are at the core of WTO law. Largely varying tariff 
schedules and schedules of commitments in services construct the backbone 
of the world trading system.177 While market access commitments agreed on 
the liberalization of trade in services are modest, over 80.000 tariff lines have 
thus far been bound. Members can therefore, by modifying commitments, 
unilaterally increase or reduce a broad range of rights and obligations in WTO 
law. As entries in schedules tend to be member-specific, members may 
flexibly tailor their commitments to their circumstances and interests.  
Yet, before the completion of the Uruguay Round, renegotiation of 
commitments occurred every year with respect to some 100 items on 
average, as compared to the 80.000 tariff lines bound. During 1951–1994, 42 
contracting parties availed themselves of the renegotiation option some 300 
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times. After the completion of the Uruguay Round, only 34 requests for 
modification have been made.178 In the absolute minority of these cases was 
there the need to proceed unilaterally. 
The mechanisms for – and disciplines on – modification of market access 
commitments are nevertheless without question important to the WTO 
members. Sometimes, the political cost of maintaining a bound commitment 
is perceived by members as too large. For instance, following the dispute 
settlement proceedings in US – Gambling, the US may deem it necessary to 
proceed unilaterally following arbitration. The provisions providing members 
the possibility to unilaterally modify their legally binding commitments are 
therefore essential flexibility mechanisms, which facilitate realities 





                                           
178 Table of goods schedules, available at the website of the WTO: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_table_e.htm (visited 20 December 2008). 
